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Abstract: The idea that the quantum probabilities are best construed as the
personal/subjective degrees of belief of Bayesian agents is an old one. In recent
years the idea has been vigorously pursued by a group of physicists who y the
banner of quantum Bayesianism (QBism). The present paper aims to identify
the prospects and problems of implementing QBism, and it critically assesses the
claim that QBism provides a resolution (or dissolution) of some of the long standing
foundations issues in quantum mechanics, including the measurement problem and
puzzles of non-locality.
1 Introduction
Bruno de Finetti, the patron saint of the personalist (a.k.a. subjectivist)
interpretation of probability, famously proclaimed that THERE ARE NO
PROBABILITIES(de Finetti 1990, p. x). Decoding the bombast, what de
Finetti meant to convey is the claim that there are no probabilities in nature,
no objective physical probabilities (a.k.a. chances); there are only the degrees
of belief of individual agents who, if rational, regiment their credences in
conformity with the axioms of probability theory. Although an appendix in
Vol. 2 of de Finettis Theory of Probability (1990, pp. 313-321) sketches
some of the formalism of quantum mechanics (QM), de Finetti himself did
not take up the challenge of showing how physicistsdeployment of quantum
probabilities can be understood in personalist terms. Philosophers of science
have an abiding concern with the nature and meaning of probability, and it
is natural that some of them have taken up this challenge (see, for example,
Pitowsky 2006). But in recent years the major push for a personalist reading
of quantum probabilities has come not from philosophers but from physicists
who march under the banner of quantum Bayesianism (or QBism for short).
In the vanguard are Carleton Caves, Christopher Fuchs, and Rüdiger Schack,
and David Mermin.1 Hans Christian von Baeyer, a recent convert to QBism,
1A presentation of QBism intended for a philosophy of science audience is to be
found in Caves, Fuchs, and Schack (2007). Presentations aimed at a general physics au-
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has o¤ered a manifesto intended for the educated lay audience (von Baeyer
2016).
What the QBians propose is a program for understanding quantum physics
that promises to resolve (or dissolve) some of the long standing puzzles that
emerge from quantum theory. Although still in the development stage, the
program has made considerable progress, and it is mature enough that it can
benet from critical assessment. And, indeed, critical reviews have already
appeared, an especially insightful and evenhanded one supplied by Timpson
(2008).2 I will o¤er an assessment of QBism that is at once more sympa-
thetic and more critical: QBians create faux di¢ culties for themselves; they
refuse to accept victories that are readily at hand and, thereby, fail to convey
some of the strengths of their stance; more importantly, they fail to recognize
lacunae in and awkward features of their program; and they oversell their
attempted resolution of foundations puzzles.
At the outset let me stipulate that, for present purposes, I accept one
form of quantum Bayesianism; namely, the inductive inferences that physi-
cists make about quantum events is best discussed in a Bayesian personalist
framework. But quantum events have a non-commutative structure, and this
necessitates appropriate adjustments in the familiar Bayesian framework for
classical probabilities in particular, adjustments are required in the classical
conditionalization rule for updating personal probabilities. This is something
that apparently de Finetti did not recognize and is not clearly explained in
QBism literature. This mild form of quantum Bayesianism is, of course,
perfectly compatible with a rejection of the monism of de Finetti and the
QBians in favor of a pluralism with respect to the interpretation of proba-
bility in quantum physics: more specically, a pluralism that sees the need
both for a personalist interpretation of the probabilities used to reconstruct
the inferences of quantum physicists and for an objectivist interpretation of
the probabilities delivered by the apparatus of QM, probabilities that osten-
sively are about the tendencies exhibited by quantum systems rather than
the credences of quantum physicists.
Such pluralists owe us an account of how the two types of probability
dience are to be found in Mermin (2012, 2014) and Fuchs, Mermin, and Schack (2014).
Versions of FuchsQBian manifesto are to be found in Fuchs (2002, 2010). More techni-
cal presentations of various aspects of QBism include Caves, Fuchs, and Schack (2002a,
2002b, 2002c), Fuchs and Schack (2004, 2013), Fuchs, Schack, and Scudo (2004), and
Schack, Brun, and Caves (2001).
2See also Bacciagaluppi (2013), Palge and Konrad (2008), and Stairs (2011).
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are related. Philosophersinstinct is to postulate, the most famous example
being David LewisPrincipal Principle (PP) which postulates a principle of
rationality linking objective chance and rational credence.3 Mathematicians
instinct is to prove rather than postulate. In the case of quantum probabili-
ties it turns out that proof su¢ ces in that a form of the Principal Principle
is a theorem of quantum probability, a result the QBians can use to argue
that so-called objective quantum probabilities are just the objectication of
personalist probabilities. But, curiously, QBians turn their backs on such
result an example of what I mean by refusing to accept victories readily at
hand.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sketches an approach to
quantum probabilities that facilitates a comparison between the objectivist
vs. subjectivist interpretation of quantum probabilities, and it sets out the
grounds for the former. The subjectivist interpretation promoted by the
QBians is discussed in Section 3. It is able to get a foothold through the
basic representation theorem of quantum probabilities, a theorem that is
much more powerful than de Finettis representation theorem for classical
probabilities in that it does not rely on exchangeability or other substantive
requirement on credence functions, save for a condition on additivity. And it
is shown how the QBians can gain rmer footing by means of some corollaries
of the basic representation theorem. Thus far I have tried to help the QBians
put the best face on their program. But in Section 4 I air some qualms about
the QBian approach to quantum probabilities, none of which is even near
fatal but together may dampen enthusiasm for pursuing the QBian program.
This enthusiasm is further dampened by a critical examination in Section
5 of claims that QBism delivers a resolution of the quantum measurement
problem and puzzles about quantum non-locality. Conclusions are contained
in Section 6. An Appendix discusses the so-called operational approach to
QM to which the QBians sometimes appeal.
3The original formulation of PP is in Lewis (1980). Exactly how to formulate and
justify Lewisidea has generated considerable controversy in the philosophical literature.
For present purposes it is not necessary to wade into this controversy.
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2 The formalism of QM and the objectivist
reading of quantum probabilities
2.1 The algebraic formulation of QM
In the approach to quantum theory adopted here a quantum system is char-
acterized by an algebra of observables and a set of states on the algebra.
For present purposes the algebra is assumed to be a von Neumann algebra
N acting on a Hilbert space H.4 To make the discussion manageable the
case of ordinary non-relativistic QM (sans superselection rules) will be the
focus of discussion, which is to say that N is the Type I factor algebraB(H),
the von Neumann algebra of all bounded operators acting on H.5 In many
applications it su¢ ces to use a Hilbert space that is separable (i.e. has a
countable orthonormal basis), but applications requiring higher dimensional
spaces can be contemplated.
A projection E 2 B(H) is a self-adjoint element such that E2 = E. The
range Ran(E) of E is a closed subspace of H, and for B(H) the projections
are in one-one correspondence with the closed subspaces of H. The pro-
jections P(B(H)) have a lattice structure that derives from a partial order
whereby E1  E2 i¤ Ran(E1)  Ran(E2).6 That P(B(H)) forms a lattice
means that it is closed under meet E1 ^ E2 and join E1 _ E2 of E1; E2 2
P(B(H)), which are dened respectively as the greatest lower bound and
the least upper bound and are respectively the projections corresponding to
Ran(E1) \ Ran(E2) and the closure of Ran(E1) [ Ran(E2). Projections E1
and E2 are said to be mutually orthogonal i¤Ran(E1)\Ran(E2) = ?. When
E1 and E2 are mutually orthogonal E1 ^ E2 = E1E2 = E2E1 = E2 ^ E1 = 0
and E1 _ E2 = E1 + E2.
The elements of the projection lattice P(B(H)) are referred to as quan-
tum propositions (also yes-no questions, or quantum events). Quantum prob-
ability theory may be thought of as the study of quantum probability func-
tions Pr on P(B(H)) (see Hamhalter 2003). Pr is required to satisfy
(a) Pr : P(B(H))! [0; 1]
4The relevant operator algebra theory can be found in Bratelli and Robinson (1987)
and Kadison and Ringrose (1997).
5A factor algebra N has a trivial center, i.e. N \ N0 = CI, where N0 denotes the
commutant of N. When superselection rules are present the center is non-trivial.
6This is equivalent to requiring that E1  E2 i¤ E2   E1 is a positive operator.
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(b) Pr(I) = 1, where I is the identity operator
(c) Pr(E _ F ) = Pr(E + F ) = Pr(E) + Pr(F ) for all mutually
orthogonal pairs E;F 2 P(B(H)).
The condition (c) of nite additivity may be strengthened to require complete
additivity
(c) Pr(
P
a2I Ea) =
P
a2I Pr(Ea) for any family fEag of mutually
orthogonal projections.7
When H is separable any family of mutually orthogonal projections is count-
able, in which case (c) reduces to the condition of countable additivity.
Quantum states are normed positive linear functionals mapping elements
of B(H) to C. Most standard texts on QM assume that the physically
realizable states are the normal states N , states with a density operator rep-
resentation, i.e. there is a density operator % (a trace class operator on H
with Tr(%) = 1) such that !(A) = Tr(%A) for all A 2 B(H).8 This assump-
tion requires justication; for present purposes su¢ ce it to say that several
lines of argument converge to provide a strong motivation,9 but occasionally
there are rumblings in the literature supporting the use of non-normal states
in interpreting features of QM. A vector state is a state ! such that there
is a vector  2 H with !(A) = h jAj i for all A 2 B(H). Vector states
are normal, and for B(H) vector states coincide with the pure states, i.e.
states ! such that there are no distinct states !1 and !2 and real numbers
0 < 1; 2 < 1, 1+ 2 = 1, such that ! = 1!1 + 2!2. Impure states are
also referred to as mixed states.
Quantum states onB(H) induce quantum probability functions onP(B(H)).
It is easily checked that for any quantum state ! onB(H), Pr!(E) :=!(E) for
E 2 P(B(H)) is a quantum probability, i.e. satises the conditions (a)-(c).
Furthermore, if ! is a normal state then Pr! is completely additive, whereas
if ! non-normal then Pr! will be merely countably or merely nitely additive
depending on the dimension of H. It is natural to ask whether the process of
moving from quantum states on B(H) to probabilities on P(B(H)) can be
7If I is innite, the convergence ofPa2I Ea is taken in the weak operator topology.
8This is what physicists call the Born rule for calculating probabilities see below.
9For a discussion of arguments in favor of identifying the normal states with the
physically realizable states, see Ruetsche (2011) and Arageorgis et al. (2017).
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reversed so that quantum states can be recovered from quantum probabili-
ties. This question will be answered below.
2.2 The objectivist reading of quantum probabilities
On the objectivist interpretation of quantum probabilities quantum states
codify observer independent physical features of quantum systems. Thus,
on this interpretation, the probabilities induced by quantum states are, pace
de Finetti, objective physical probabilities. The objectivist reading of quan-
tum probabilities has more going for it than merely postulating theoretical
entities and sticking the label objective on them; for it is supported by
infrastructure of the theory which gives an account of state preparation, at
least for the normal pure states. A basic interpretational tenet of QM holds
that the elements of the projection lattice P(B(H)) are in principle veri-
able/refutable by appropriate yes-noexperiments. The theory itself does
not provide a manual for how to construct a laboratory device for carrying
out the experiment that belongs to the experimental practicum of QM.
Among the elements of P(B(H)) is the support projector S' for a normal
state, dened as the smallest projection in P(B(H)) to which ' assigns
probability 1. Since normal pure states on B(H) are coextensive with the
vector states and P(B(H)) contains all projectors, the support projector S'
for a normal pure state ' is the projector onto the ray spanned its vector
representative. As a result, S' for a normal pure state serves as a lter for
' in the set N of all normal states, viz. for any ! 2 N (pure or impure)
such that !(S') 6= 0, !(S'AS')=!(S') = '(A) for all A 2 B(H) (see
Ruetsche and Earman 2011). By the von Neumann projection postulate,
when a measurement of F 2 P(B(H)) is made on a system initially in state
! and the measurements returns a Yes answer, the new state of the system
is !F () := !(F  F )=!(F ). Hence, whatever the initial state !, as long as
!(S') 6= 0, a Yes answer to a measurement of S' for a normal pure state '
ensures that the new state !S' is '. A normal impure (or mixed) state does
not have a lter, and so there is no preparation procedure in this sense for
impure states (see Ruetsche and Earman 2011).
So much for the formalism. It is now time for Nature to weigh in. Prepare
a quantum system in a normal pure state '. Conduct a yes-no experiment
for some E 2 P(B(H)), and record the result. Reset the system (or a similar
system) in the same state ', and repeat the yes-no experiment for E. The
probability for a Yes outcome on any trial is '(E) regardless of the outcomes
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on any other trials, which is to say the experimental protocol gives i.i.d. trials.
The strong law of large numbers thus implies that as the number of trials
tends to innity the frequency of Yes responses almost surely tends to '(E).
In actual realizations of such experiments expectations are fullled in that
there is rapid apparent convergence to the value supplied by the quantum
formalism. Of course, the inductive skeptic will caution that the apparent
convergence may disappear if trials are continued into the indenite future,
but such skepticism if pushed too far would undermine all scientic inquiry.
In short, it is hard to resist the notion that the probabilities delivered by the
quantum formalism latch on to objective features of the physical world.
3 The personalist interpretation of quantum
probabilities
The most natural way to try to implement de Finettis personalism in QM
is to reject the idea that quantum probabilities on the projection lattice
P(B(H)) arise from quantum states on B(H) construed as codifying objec-
tive features of physical systems (call this the top-down perspective); rather
the starting point should be probability functions on P(B(H)) construed as
the credence functions of actual or potential Bayesian agents (call this the
bottom-up perspective). To make such reading viable three things are re-
quired: a representation theorem relating probability measures on P(B(H))
to quantum states on B(H) (this provides the route upfor the bottom-up
perspective); a rule for updating a credence function on P(B(H)); and a per-
sonalist alternative to the objectivist account of state preparation. All three
are available (almost entirely) o¤-the-shelf, although the QBians convey the
impression that there is a need to reinvent the wheel.
3.1 The Gleason representation theorem and the sta-
tus of quantum states
Perhaps mimicking de Finettis THEREARENOPROBABILITIES, Christo-
pher Fuchs writes that THERE ARE NO QUANTUM STATES (Fuchs
2002, Sec. 9 and 2010, Sec. II). Decoding the bombast of the latter, Fuchs
slogan is not meant to assert the absurdity that there are no quantum states
qua expectation functionals on the algebra of observables, but rather that
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these mathematical objects do not carry the ontological clout that the ob-
jectivists assign them. That is, for QBians quantum states do not codify
objective features of the quantum system, and they do not induce objective
chances on the projection lattice of quantum propositions; rather, quantum
states are to be viewed as bookkeeping devices that can be used to keep track
of credences that QBian agents assign to elements of P(B(H)).
This proposed shift of perspective gains its initial purchase through Glea-
sons theorem, the basic representation theorem for quantum probabilities:
Prop. 1. Let H be a separable Hilbert space and suppose that
dim(H)  3 . For any probability measure Pr on P(B(H)) there
is a unique extension of Pr to a quantum state !Pr on B(H).
Further, if Pr is countably additive (respectively, merely nitely
additive) then !Pr is a normal (respectively, non-normal) quan-
tum state.
Gleasons theorem has been extended to quite general von Neumann algebras,
including the Type III algebras encountered in the algebraic formulation
relativistic QFT (see Maeda 1990 and Hamhalter 2003).
Thus far there is nothing in the mathematics that favors the objectivist
top-down point of view wherein quantum probabilities are objective chances
that arise from normal quantum states which codify objective features of
quantum systemsvs. the QBian bottom-up perspective wherein probabili-
ties on P(B(H)) are to be interpreted as arising from the credence functions
of QBian agents, and normal quantum states are merely devices that repre-
sent these completely additive credence functions. This is about to change
to the detriment of QBism.
3.2 Updating quantum probabilities
Suppose that a QBian agent learns that F 2 P(B(H)) is true. How should
she update her personal probability function Pr to accommodate this new
knowledge? The most commonly accepted rule is motivated by the following
proposition:
Prop. 2. Let Pr be a countably additive quantum probability
measure on P(B(H)) for separable H with dim(H)  3, and
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let F 2 P(B(H)) be such that Pr(F ) 6= 0. Then there is a
unique functional PrF () on P(B(H)) such that (a) PrF () is
a quantum probability, and (b) for all E 2 P(B(H)) such that
E  F , PrF (E) = Pr(E)=Pr(F ).10
Condition (b) is the direct quantum analog of the condition that uniquely
picks out classical conditionalization as the rule for updating in classical
probability (aka Bayes updating). The unique PrF () is called Lüders con-
ditionalization or, as I will refer to it, Lüders updating.
What is PrF ()? The answer is something of an embarrassment to the
QBians because it requires a detour though quantum states. It is easy to
verify that if ! is a normal state and F 2 P(B(H)) is such that !(F ) 6= 0 then
!F (E) := !(FEF )=!(F ), E 2 P(B(H)), denes a normal state !F . Hence,
Pr!F (E) = !F (E), E 2 P(B(H)), denes a countably additive quantum
probability if H is separable and ! is normal. The functional PrF () picked
out by Prop. 2 the Lüders F -updating of Pr is the probability Pr!F ()
induced by !F where ! is the unique normal state that by Gleasons theorem
corresponds to the countably additive Pr.
Why is this detour through states necessary? When E;F 2 P(B(H))
commute FEF = EF = FE = E ^ F 2 P(B(H)) and, thus, Lüders
updating can be expressed as PrF (E) = Pr(E ^ F )=Pr(F ), which agrees
with classical Bayes updating. However, when E and F dont commute
FEF =2 P(B(H)) and Lüders updating cannot be expressed as PrF (E) =
Pr(FEF )=Pr(F ) since Pr(FEF ) is undened. If quantum states were merely
bookkeeping devices used to track the degrees of belief QBians agents they
should be dispensable. But apparently they are needed for something as
basic as updating the QBian belief functions.
3.3 Objectication
The interpretation of quantum states I attributed to the QBians has the
consequence that there are as many quantum states are there are actual or
potential Bayesian agents. This seems to y in the face of quantum state
preparation which ostensibly establishes a unique objective, observer inde-
pendent state. A reconciliation can be achieved by means of some (almost)
o¤-the-shelf results.
10See Bub (1977) and Cassinelli and Zanghi (1983). The latter authors generalize this
result to arbitrary von Neumann algebras.
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Prop. 3. Let Pr be a countably additive probability function on
P(B(H)) where dim(H)  3 and H separable. If ' is a normal
pure state such that Pr(S') 6= 0 (S' the support projector for ')
then PrS'() = '().
The proof is straightforward. By Gleasons theorem Pr extends uniquely to
a normal state !Pr on B(H). If Pr(S') 6= 0 then !(S') 6= 0 and, thus,
PrS'(E) =
!Pr(S'ES')
!Pr(S')
= '(E), E 2 P(B(H))
where the last equality follows by the lter property of S'.
From the objectivist perspective Prop. 3 can be viewed as a special case of
LewisPP: when an agent learns that S' is true she learns that the objective
chances are given by the state '; updating by Lüders conditionalizing on this
knowledge brings her credences into line with the objective chances assigned
by '. Contra what the philosophical literature on PP assumes, there is
no need here for an additional principle of rationality; for the alignment of
credence and chance is guaranteed as a theorem of quantum probability, at
least for agents whose credence functions are countably countably.11
QBians will put a di¤erent spin on Prop. 3, emphasizing an immediate
corollary:
Cor. Let ' be a normal pure state. All quantum Bayesian agents
who have countably additive credence functions on P(B(H)),
with dim(H)  3, experience merger of opinion when updating
on S', provided that these credence functions give non-zero prior
probability to S'; specically, they all concur that the updated
credence for any E 2 P(B(H)) is '(E).
QBians can now sermonize as follows: We QBians can speak with the vulgar
without being vulgar; that is, we can speak of objectivequantum probabil-
ity without admitting that it is the probability induced by quantum states
construed as characterizing objective features of a quantum system (the top-
down perspective). Rather, objectivequantum probability emerges from
the bottom-up perspective as the objectied or merged opinion that results
when Bayesian agents update their prior opinions by conditionalizing on the
proposition S' expressed by the support projection of a normal pure state
11For more on LewisPrincipal Principle in QM see Earman (2018).
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'. To be sure this merger of opinion only applies to the subset of Bayesian
agents who give S' a non-zero prior; but that is as it should be since those
who give S' a atly zero prior will not be swayed by evidence that other
agents take as decisive in favor of S'. The lack of universality of merger
only goes to underscore, the QBians will say, the subjectivist foundation of
so-called objective probability.
To my knowledge, QBians nowhere propose even this modest form of
reconciliation, perhaps because they think it compromises the staunch form
of personalism they favor. For example, Caves, Fuchs, and Schack (2007)
seem to think that they need to perform the following modus tollens move:
If facts determined the quantum state then QBism would be wrong; but it
is not wrong and, therefore, facts do not determine the quantum state.
The objective-preparations view [of quantum states] supports the
seeming need for a PP-style account by positing that classical
facts about a preparation device determine the prepared quantum
state ... The subjective Bayesian interpretation of quantum prob-
abilities contends, in contrast, that facts alone never determine a
quantum state. What the objective-preparations view leaves out
is the essential quantum nature of the preparation device, which
means that the prepared quantum state always depends on prior
beliefs in the guise of a quantum operation that describes the
preparation device. (Caves, Fuchs, and Schack 2007, pp. 262-
263; italics in original).
A PP-style accountof state preparation is not something imposed by dis-
ciples of David Lewis: the quantum PP encapsulated in Prop. 3 is a theorem
of quantum probability and, thus, is not something the QBians can choose
to ignore. Nor does the account of state preparation using Prop. 3 posit
classical facts or deny the quantum nature of the preparation device.
Caves et al. proceed to repeat (as if repetition can induce truth) the
conclusion of their modus tollens:
In the Bayesian view, a prepared quantum state is not determined
by facts alone, but always depends on prior beliefs ... Facts, in
the form of measurement outcomes, are used to update the prior
state ... but they never determine a quantum state ... (ibid, p.
266)
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It is quite true that when state preparation is seen through the lens of
Bayesianism, facts in the form of measurement outcomes never determine a
quantum state in the sense wanted by the objectivist, i.e. an objective physi-
cal feature of the system that dictates probability assignments in a top-down
manner. For a quantum state is seen through the QBian lens as simply a
device for representing credences, and what happens in so-called state prepa-
ration is that the prior credences of a Bayesian agent are Lüders updated on
the measurement outcome, producing new credences and, ipso facto, a new
state which is (as the QBians rightly note) dependent on the prior credences.
But facts, in the form of measurement outcomes, can determine a quantum
state in the sense of Bayesian personalism since, as seen above, conditional-
izing on said facts can lead to the same credence function (= quantum state
on the QBian understanding) for all those agents who do not exclude a pri-
ori the measurement outcomes (by assigning them atly zero credence). In
sum, I nd it ba­ ing that QBians should refuse to accept the obvious way
in which their view can accommodate state preparation.
4 Some speed bumps on the road to QBism
In the preceding section I attempted to help the QBians frame their view
of quantum probabilities in a manner that would make it seem a viable al-
ternative to the objectivist view. I now turn to worries about the QBian
program: two concern gaps in my framing of QBism; a third concerns the
Dutch book justication for axioms of probability in the case of high dimen-
sional Hilbert spaces; and the fourth concerns a disquieting implication of
the QBian instrumentalist treatment of quantum states.
4.1 Dimension 2
For dim(H) = 2 and indeed for any H such that dim(H) < 1 all quantum
states on B(H) are normal. But for dim(H) = 2 Gleasons theorem does not
hold, and there are probability functions on P(B(H)) that are not extendible
to any quantum state on B(H).12 On the objectivist top-down approach
12Example: For dim(H) = 2 dene a probability function on P(B(H)) as follows.
Choose two orthogonal rays R1; R2 in H and denote their corresponding projections by
E1; E2. Set Pr(E1) = Pr(E2) = 1=2. For any other pair of orthogonal rays R3; R4 and
their corresponding projections E3; E4 set Pr(E3) = 0 and Pr(E4) = 1 or vice versa.
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this failure of Gleasons theorem is no cause for alarm; the rogue probability
functions can simply be dismissed as mathematical oddities because they are
not induced by any quantum state and, therefore, cannot codify objective
chances. But the failure of Gleasons theorem should be a cause for alarm on
the bottom-up personalist reading of probabilities. For there do not seem to
be any non-question begging grounds of rationality on which a Bayesian agent
with such a quantum non-compatible credence function can be excluded from
the QBian camp as having irrational credences. And to exclude such an
agent simply because he has a non-quantum compatible credence function is
to compromise Bayesian personalism and, thus, QBism insofar as it embodies
personalism.
This is only a minor embarrassment for the QBians since the real world
is not described by a q-bit space; indeed, to describe a system as simple
as a single spinless particle moving in space requires an innite dimensional
Hilbert space, where Gleasons theorem applies. But it is an embarrassment
nevertheless since q-bit spaces are often used by QBians themselves to il-
lustrate quantum probabilities. When one moves from nite dimensional to
innite dimensional Hilbert spaces a di¤erent set of worries assault QBism.
4.2 The Born rule, normal states, and countable addi-
tivity
Some QBians struggle mightily over the status of the Born rule.For exam-
ple, in QBism, the Perimeter of Quantum BayesianismFuchs likens the
Born rule to one of the Biblical Ten Commandments.
The Born Rule is not like the other classic laws of physics. Its
normative nature means, if anything it is more like the Biblical
Ten Commandments ... The Born Rule guides, Gamble in such
a way that all your probabilities mesh together through me.The
agent is free to ignore the advice, but if he does so, he does so at
his own peril. (Fuchs 2010, p. 8)
And later the Born rule is said to be an addition to Bayesian probability
And nally set Pr(I) = 1. This Pr is not induced by any state on B(H). For all states
on B(H) with dim(H) = 2 are normal; and any normal state and, thus, the probability
function it induces on P(B(H)), is continuous in the weak, strong, and ultra-weak oper-
ator topology (see Brattelli and Robinson 1987, Theorem 7.1.12). But the Pr in question
is obviously not continuous.
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not in the sense of a supplier of more-objective probabilities, but
in the sense of giving extra normative rules to guide the agents
behavior when he interacts with the physical world. (ibid, p. 12).
But there is no mystery here, biblical or otherwise; nor is extra normative
guidance required. By Gleasons theorem a countably additive (respectively,
completely additive) measure Pr on P(B(H)) withH separable (respectively,
non-separable), whether or not it is given a personalist interpretation, cor-
responds to a normal state !Pr on B(H) and, therefore, the probabilities
are given by the Born rule (a.k.a. trace rule), viz. there is a density op-
erator !Pr on the Hilbert space on which B(H) acts such that Pr(E) =
!Pr(E) = Tr(!PrE) for all E 2 P(N).
Still the QBians fret about the status of !Pr in the Born rule does its use
allow the reviled objectivism to come through the back door? But QBians
should stop fretting since they have already answered this concern: for them
the quantum state !Pr is just a bookkeeping device for a Bayesian agents
credences codied in Pr and, further, the density operator !Pr is just a
computational device the book keeper can employ in calculating probabilities.
I am ba­ ed again: Why nd problems for your view where there are none?
Actually there is a problem lurking underneath the above discussion. It
arises from the assumption that Pr is countably or completely additive. Per-
haps this is the true source of QBians swivet about the Born rule. On
the top-down objectivist approach to quantum probabilities the Born rule
is equivalent to the assertion that only normal states are physically realiz-
able. As mentioned above there are strong but not denitive arguments for
this assertion. On the bottom-up personalist approach to quantum prob-
abilities when dim(H) = 1 (the real world case) and H is separable (re-
spectively, non-separable) the Born rule holds for a Bayesian agent just in
case that agents credence function on P(B(H)) is countably additive (re-
spectively, completely additive). So if the QBians want to hew to the Born
rule they must exclude from their camp agents with non- countably or non-
completely additive credence function, and seemingly the only non-question
begging grounds on which they can justify such an exclusion is to maintain
that such credence functions violate the norms of rationality of belief. Pur-
suing this line would, by the way, cast out their patron saint de Finetti who
hewed to nite additivity13, and it would enmesh the QBians in the on going
13For de Finettis views on nite vs. countable additivity, see his (1972, Ch. 5), (1990,
Vol. 1, Sec. 3.11), (1990, Vol. 2, Sec. 18.3). I read de Finetti as saying not only that ra-
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debate in the Bayesian statistics literature on merits of nite vs. countable
additivity. This is not the place to review the debate, and I simply refer
the interested reader to the relevant literature (see Kadane et al. 1986 and
Seidenfeld 2001). But in the next subsection I will note that there is a prob-
lem lurking here for QBians who want to run the Dutch book argument for
quantum probabilities.
4.3 Dutch book and quantum probabilities
QBians try to launch their program by transferring to the quantum context
the Dutch book argument originally used by de Finetti and others in the
classical setting in order to show that rational degrees of belief ought to satisfy
the axioms of probability (see Caves et al. 2002). The argument consists of
two parts: the Dutch book theorem, whereby it is shown that if an agents
degrees of belief fail to conform to the axioms of probability then there is
a family of bets each of which the agent nds fair or favorable but which
taken together guarantee that the agent will lose money in every possible
outcome (Dutch book); and the converse Dutch book theorem, whereby it
is shown that conforming to the axioms of probability confers immunity to
Dutch book. De Finetti used the Dutch book argument to motivate nite
additivity, but the argument can be extended to cover countable additivity
as well.
So far so good. But problems arise when the Hilbert space H is non-
separable. An example is given by an innite spin chain consisting of a
countable innity of spin sites each of which may be a state of either spin
up or spin down, requiring a Hilbert space of dimension 20 which, if the
contunuum hypothesis is correct, is the power of the continuum. The devel-
opments discussed above are easily rewired to cover such cases if the prob-
ability Pr is completely additive. For example, Gleasons theorem holds in
that a completely additive Pr on P(B(H)) has a unique extension to a nor-
mal state on B(H). Similar extensions to non-separable Hilbert spaces hold
for Props. 2 and 3 if Pr is completely additive. The trouble comes in trying
to use Dutch book considerations to justify complete additivity. If (as seems
plausible) a rational agent should only be required to stand ready to accept
tional credence does not require countable additivity but also that countable additivity
ought to be rejected in favor of nite additivity. But even if de Finetti is read as tak-
ing the less harsh position that countable additivity is acceptable but nite additivity is
good enough for rational credence, he and his followers create a problem for the QBians.
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bets that she regards as favorable (as opposed to merely fair) then although
the Dutch book theorem shows that a failure of countable additivity means
that the agent is subject to a sure loss, a failure of complete additivity does
not entail a sure loss (see Skyrms 1992).
A possible out for the QBians lies in the fact that for ordinary QM, with
B(H) the algebra of observables, complete additivity on P(B(H)) reduces
to countable additivity unless H has a dimension as great as the least mea-
surable cardinal. Since no known applications of QM require Hilbert spaces
of such huge dimension, countable additivity su¢ ces FAPP. However, this
reduction of complete additivity to countable additivity does not hold for
the observable algebras encountered in relativistic QFT (see Arageorgis et
al. 2017).
4.4 Dynamics: Schrödinger and Heisenberg evolution
In the conventional quantum mechanical treatment, the state dynamics is
given by Schrödinger evolution. Assuming that the Hamiltonian H of the
system is essentially self-adjoint, its exponentiation to U(t) := exp( i~Ht),
 1 < t < +1, is a strongly continuous unitary group in the parameter t,
which is interpreted as time. If the state on the algebraB(H) of observables is
!0 at t = 0 then the state at t > 0 is !t() := !0(U 1(t)U(t)). If !0 is a vec-
tor state corresponding to the vector j oi then !t is a vector state correspond-
ing to the vector j ti = U(t)j oi, per the familiar Schrödinger picture. On
the top-down objectivist interpretation of quantum probabilities, according
to which quantum probabilities arise from quantum states, the temporal evo-
lution of probabilities is the evolution induced by the Schrödinger evolution
of states, viz. Prt(E) := Pr!t(E) := !t(E) for E 2 P(B(H)).
In QBism where the quantum state is merely a device for representing
the credence function of a Bayesian agent, the state changes only when the
agentss credence function changes. Changes in the credence function can
happen because the agent updates her credence function on new information,
or because of some sort of drift in beliefs uninformed by new information.
QBians do not discuss the latter possibility, and for good reason since unin-
formed drift does not have a rational explanation. The upshot for QBians
is that, as far as rational agents are concerned, there is no Schrödinger state
evolution between updating events.
How then does QBism account for the conventional expectation whose
success is borne out in the statistics of measurement outcomes that if
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the probabilities at t = 0 are those induced by the state !0 then at t >
0 the probabilities are those induced by the state !t Schrödinger evolved
from !0? The answer, of course, is that the QBians can adopt a form of
Heisenberg evolution: if at t = 0 an observable is represented by a self-
adjoint operator A0 2 B(H) then at t > 0 the observable is represented by
At := U
 1(t)A0U(t). In the conventional treatment of quantum evolution,
Heisenberg and Schrödinger evolution are ip sides of the same coin since
!0(At) = !t(A0). But in QBism Heisenberg evolution has primacy since the
right hand side of this equality makes no sense for the QBian unless it is
understood as a notational variant of the left hand side. Similarly, restated
in the language of probability functions on P(B(H)) the conventional treat-
ment makes the Heisenberg and Schrödinger evolution of probabilities ips
side of the same coin since for E0 2 P(B(H)), Pr0(Et) = Prt(E0) where
Pr0() := Pr!0() , Prt() := Pr!t() , and Et := U 1(t)E0U(t). But the
QBian will insist that the Heisenberg expression Pr0(Et) is the preferred ex-
pression for probability dynamics and the Schrödinger Prt(E0) expression is
be understood as a notational variant.
What is disquieting about the QBian stance here is the dualism it im-
plies: there is something like a realist/objectivist commitment to the struc-
ture of quantum observables and their temporal evolution but an instru-
mentalist/subjectivist attitude towards quantum states. But reasons for a
realist/objectivist commitment on observables are of a piece with reasons for
a realist/objectivist commitment on states. The QBians may reply that the
dualism serves them well in resolving puzzles that have bedeviled discussions
of the foundations of QM. This claim is addressed in the following section.
5 Does QBism tame foundations puzzles?
QBism deals with puzzles in the foundations of QM mainly by sidestepping
them. Sidestepping a problem can be an honorable tactic, but in the present
instance the QBian form of this tactic comes with costs. One of the main
means of avoidance is the QBian rejection of the value assignment rule that is
typically adjoined to the objectivist take on quantum states, and the price for
the rejection is a loss in explanatory power. The discussion below is conned
to the case of ordinary QM.
The objectivist value assignment rule is often stated for a special case of
an observable with a discrete spectrum: If the state of the system is a vector
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state j i and j i is an eigenstate of a self-adjoint operator O with eigenvalue
o then the system possesses a value o of the observable corresponding to O.
The natural generalization of this rule in the algebraic formulation is:
(R) If ! is the state of the system is a pure state and !(E) = 1,
where E 2P(B(H)), then E is true.
A converse rule is often bruited but remains controversial because it helps
to generate the measurement problem in QM (see below): If the state of
the system is a vector state j i then the system possesses a value o of the
observable corresponding toO only if j i is an eigenstate ofO with eigenvalue
o. The natural generalization to the algebraic formulation is:
(C) If the state ! of the system is a pure state then E 2P(B(H))
is true only if !(E) = 1.
It should be clear why the QBians must reject (R): for them quantum
states are merely ways to represent the degrees of beliefs of agents, and the
move from Pr(E) = 1 for me (or for any agent)to E is truewould lead
to contradictions. QBians must reject (C) as well; for E is truedoes not
imply that any particular Bayesian agent assigns degree of belief 1 to E.
Such rejectionism, coupled with the refusal and the apparent inability
to provide alternative valuation rules, allows the QBians to avoid issues that
may leave the objectivist perplexed. For example, before Schrödingers in-
famous box is opened, is the cat alive, or is it dead, or is it neither? And
what does neithermean? When the QBian asked such questions he sim-
ply smiles and replies: I do not bother with such matters since I have no
means of answering one way or another because I reject the objectivists
value assignment rules and decline to provide others. All I am concerned
with is assigning degrees of belief to propositions about what will be found
when Schrödingers box is opened. Although it initially seems liberating,
the appeal of such sidestepping quickly wears thin.
5.1 The measurement problem
In conventional quantum mechanics the measurement problem arises from a
refusal to take measurementas a primitive, unexplained term of the theory
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and the insistence that a measurement is to be treated as an interaction
between an object system and a measurement instrument and, perhaps, also
an interaction between the measuring instrument and an observer who reads
the indicator dial on the measuring instrument. The problem arises because,
as any number of no-go theorems show, the description of the interaction in
the composite system (observer + measuring instrument + object system) in
terms of Schrödinger/Heisenberg evolution seems incapable of accounting for
observed measurement outcomes and, indeed incapable of accounting for the
fact that measurements have determinate outcomes if the objectivist value
assignment rules (R) and (C) are applied.
The proposed solutions to the measurement problem are so various as to
defy a neat classication, but for present purposes it su¢ ces to take the main
divide to be between collapse vs. non-collapse solutions. Some non-collapse
solutions, such as the family of modal interpretations (see Lombardi and
Dieks (2014)) maintain an objectivist stance on quantum states but reject
(C) and assign a value to an observable even when the state of the system
is not an eigenstate of the observable being measured.14 Here I ignore such
interpretations and concentrate on collapse solutions.
On the objectivist reading of quantum states, state vector collapsein-
volves a physical change in the state of the quantum systemwherein Schrödinger
evolution is interrupted, and the superposition of the pre-measurement state
collapses into an eigenstate of the observable being measured.15 The QBian
dissolution of the measurement problem can be classied as a species of
collapse interpretation, but with the seemingly attractive feature that no
physical explanation of state vector collapse is required. Since for the QBian
the quantum state is nothing but a representation of a Bayesian agents cre-
dences, state vector collapse is nothing but a change in the mathematical
representation of the agents credence function that takes place when the
agent updates on the information about the measurement outcome.
So far so good. But QBism does nothing to help resolve the core is-
sue of why measurements have denite outcomes or, in more QBian friendly
14Other non-collapse interpretations include many worlds interpretations (see Vaid-
man 2015) and Bohmian mechanics (see Goldstein 2013).
15Among the collapse interpretations is the now almost forgotten proposal of Wigner
(1961, 1963) whereby the action of the consciousness of the observer produces a change
in the state of the instrument and object systems, as well as the more highly regarded
family of GRW interpretations (see Ghirardi 2011) which propose physical mechanisms
for producing state vector collapse.
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terms, why QBian agents experience denite outcomes. As long as a QBian
agent is treated as an abstract, disembodied probability calculator that is
fed information by an oracle the issue can be avoided. But it resurfaces for
physically embodied observers, such as ourselves, whose information acquisi-
tion has to be treated quantum mechanically in terms of an interaction with
the (measurement apparatus + object system). QBians may respond that
they are concerned only with their own personal experiences but not with
explaining why they have these experiences or, indeed, why they have any
denite experiences at all. The experiences are what they are, and QBism
is content to organize and relate them through the probably calculus. One
way of pursuing this line would lead to a solipsistic phenomenalism. That
at least would be an interesting position. Most QBians deny that what they
are aiming for is phenomenalism. But their subjectivist interpretation of
quantum states deprives them of the resources to tackle questions about the
relation of agents to a non-phenomenalistic world. Trying to make a virtue
out of this seems a stretch.
5.2 Non-locality puzzles
Worries about spooky action-at-a-distance are generated by stirring together
three elements: entangled quantum states, an objectivist interpretation of
states, and a collapse account of measurement. To illustrate, consider the
singlet state for a two-particle system. This is a vector state whose generating
vector takes the form
j	(1; 2)i = 1p
2
[j "1i 
 j #2i   j #1i 
 j "2i]
where "and #indicate respectively spin-up and spin-down along the z-
axis.16 Two agents, Ted and Alice interact with the system, with Ted making
a measurement on particle 1 and Alice making a measurement on particle 2,
their respective measurements being made at relatively spacelike positions.17
If Ted measures spin along the z-axis then according to the collapse inter-
pretation the singlet state collapses to j "1i
 j #2i or to j #1i
 j "2i according
16This is an example of a quantum entangled state that violate the Bell inequalities.
For an overview of the meaning and implications quantum entanglement see Earman
(2015).
17Such talk can be made precise in the setting of the algebraic formulation of relativis-
tic QFT where there is an explicit association of observables with spacetime regions.
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as Ted obtains spin-up or spin-down. And on the objectivist interpretation
of quantum states this change produces an objective change at Alices lo-
cation. To be sure, no-go theorems ensure that this procedure cannot be
used by Ted to send a faster-than-light message to Alice (essentially because
Ted cannot control the outcome of his measurement on particle 1). But nev-
ertheless, there does seem to be some spooky action-at-a-distance involved,
although commentators have a hard time characterizing the spookiness and
articulating why it should be disturbing (but never mind).
Some QBians think that their reading of quantum probabilities o¤ers
simple and pain-free remedy for the spookiness:
QBist quantum mechanics is local because its entire purpose is
to enable any single agent to organize her own degrees of belief
about the contents of her own personal experience ... Quantum
correlations, by their very nature, refer only to time-like sepa-
rated events: the acquisition of experiences of any single observer.
Quantum mechanics, in the QBian interpretation, cannot assign
correlations, spooky or otherwise, to space-like separated events
since they cannot be experienced by any single agent. Quantum
mechanics is thus explicitly local in the QBian interpretation.
(Fuchs, Mermin, and Schack 2014, pp. 750-751; italics in origi-
nal)
This is a possible form of QBism, but a very crabbed and disappointing one.
On the more expansive version of QBism sketched above, QBian agents are
not concerned merely with the contents of their own personal experiences;
for they assign degrees of belief to all the elements of the projection lattice,
and for a multiparticle system this means assigning degrees of belief to ob-
servables associated with relatively spacelike regions of spacetime. To put
the point the other way around, in relativistic QFT states entangled over the
algebras associated with relatively spacelike regions have been shown to be
generic among the normal states. It is thus tantamount to abandoning the
interpretational game to adopt a form of QBism that excludes agents whose
credence functions are represented by such states on the grounds that such
states do not represent degrees of belief about the contents of the personal
experience of any one Bayesian agent.
Let us see how a less extreme form of QBism might confront locality
worries. For sake of discussion let us suppose, contra Fuchs, Mermin, and
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Schack (2014), that the singlet state represents the initial credence function
of both Ted and Alice regarding the two-particle system. Ted measures spin
along the z-axis for particle 1 and gets, say, spin-up. He Lüders updates on
this information, and his updated credence function is represented by the
state j "1i
j #2i state vector collapse to be be sure, but nothing mysterious
about it on the QBist interpretation of quantum states. Alice may receive
word of Teds result by means of a conventional non-superluminal telegram,
but until then or until she makes her own measurement on particle 2 there
is no change in her credence function for the two-particle system and, a
fortiori, no change in her state for the two particle system. When she does
receive word from Ted or makes her own measurement on particle 2 then her
credence function changes and, thus, her state for the two particle system
undergoes collapse; but again the collapse is completely non-mysterious on
the QBian reading of quantum states. At no stage is there any spooky
action-at-a-distance.
This initially looks like a success story for QBism. But the success comes
at a price. Suppose that Ted and Alice dont exchange telegrams but sim-
ply carry out their respective spin measurements on the two particles and
record their results. After repeating the procedure many times they meet to
compare results, and they nd that the measured spins of the two particles
are always anti-correlated. The objectivist interpretation of quantum states
explains why: the initial state of the object system is the objective (observer
independent) singlet state; upon measurement this state collapses either to
j "1i 
 j #2i or to j #1i 
 j "2i for both Ted and Alice (and for the whole
damn army too); and by the value assignment rule (R) the collapsed state
j "1i
 j #2i (respectively, j #1i
 j "2i) implies that particle 1 has spin-up and
particle 2 has spin-down (respectively, particle 1 has spin-down and particle
2 has spin-up). But, of course, the price paid for this explanation is some
spookiness.
On the QBian story, by contrast, the collapsed states are simply repre-
sentations of the post-measurement epistemic states of Ted and Alice. The
QBian story explains why both Ted and Alice expect, with degree of belief
one, to nd anti-correlated spins, but since a QBians agent cannot validly
move from ` Pr(E) = 1 for meto E is truethe QBian story does not ex-
plain why the measured spins are in fact anti-correlated. Retreating to the
position that QBism is concerned only the experiences of individual agents
does not provide a safe haven. For each of our agents has the experience of
nding a spin outcome for one of the particles coupled with the experience
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of the other agent reporting the opposite spin outcome for the other particle.
Again, each agent expects this with personal probability 1; but QBism does
not explain why the agents have these experiences.
In sum, on the considered version of QBism there is no spooky action-at-
a-distance, but also no explanation of striking patterns of correlated events.
On the objectivist interpretation there is an explanation of the correlation,
but it brings with it the threat of spooky action-at-a-distance. Take your
pick.
6 Conclusion
As presented above, the formalism QM lends itself to both pluralist and
monist stances on quantum probability: the pluralists, who recognize both
subjective and objective probability, can say that the formalism allows cre-
dence and chance to smoothly mesh; the monists of the de Finetti stripe, who
only countenance probability as subjective degree of belief, can (with some
caveats noted in Section 4) equally say that the formalism allows them to
treat so-called objective chance as objectied credence. Something outside
the formalism is needed to break the stando¤. Those of a realist bent will
tend to side with the pluralists, the idea being that the impressive empir-
ical success of the probabilistic predictions of QM calls for an explanation
that the monist-subjectivists are seemingly incapable of providing. But as
philosophers of science are all too aware, this line of argumentation leads di-
rectly into the swamp of the realism vs. instrumentalism debate from which
none who enter ever return.18
Amore productive line of inquiry is to contrast how the opposing views on
the nature of quantum probabilities impact on foundations issues in QM. The
objectivist stance generates puzzles aplenty. The QBian subjectivist stance
resolvesthese puzzles by side stepping them; specically, by rejecting the
objectivist value assignment rules linking quantum states to possessed prop-
erties and refusing to provide alternative rules, pleading that QBians are con-
cerned only with organizing their expectations about their experiences with
quantum systems. Adopting the objectivist stance requires taking the foun-
dations puzzles seriously and then searching either for a better understanding
of how the quantum formalism maps onto the world or for a modication of
18See Chakravartty (2014) for an overview of the status of scientic realism.
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the formalism that preserves the empirical success of QM without gener-
ating the puzzles. Adopting the QBian stance avoids all this angst from
the QBian perspective QM requires no modication or new interpretation
rules. It is tempting to choose complacency over hard work. But be aware
that such complacency will never to lead to progress in understanding a
non-phenomenalistic quantum world.
Appendix: Operational QM
A limitation of the present inquiry is its allegiance to the once standard
view that observables in QM correspond to self-adjoint operators and that
outcomes of measurements correspond to projection operators. This ortho-
doxy has been challenged by the advocates of so-called operational approach
to QM (see Busch et al. 1995) which describes measurements in terms of
e¤ects.One immediate benet of this approach is that it yields a Gleason
type theorem even for the case of dim(H) = 2. Dene the e¤ect algebraA(N)
associated with a von Neumann algebra N acting on H by A(N) := fA 2
Nsa : 0  A  Ig where Nsa denotes the self-adjoint elements of N and 
is the usual partial order relation whereby A  B i¤ B   A is a positive
operator, i.e. h(B   A) ;  i  0 for all  2 H. A generalized probability
measure on A(N) is a measure that satises analogs of axioms (a), (b),
(c) for all e¤ects. For the case of ordinary QM with N = B(H) and H
separable Busch (2003) shows that a generalized probability measure on the
e¤ect algebra A(B(H)) has, regardless of dim(H), a unique extension to a
quantum state, which is normal when the generalized probability measure is
countably additive.
QBians occasionally make use of this operational approach, but it is un-
clear how it lends itself to something that deserves to be called quantum
Bayesianism. For Bayesians, classical or quantum, probability is degree of
belief, the objects of which are propositional entities. In contrast to the pro-
jection lattice P(B(H)), the e¤ect algebra does not have a natural proposi-
tional structure. For one thing, A(B(H)) does not form a lattice under ,
i.e. the meet and join of two elements of A(B(H)) may not lie in A(B(H)).
The e¤ect algebra A(B(H)) is a lattice under an alternative partial order
s(called the spectral order) that is coarser than  (see de Groote 2005).19
However, if negation for e¤ects is dened by :A := I  A then the relations
A _s :A = I and A ^s :A = 0 hold i¤ A is a projection.
19I am grateful to Tom Pashby for this reference.
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Next note that the principle of nite additivity for e¤ects requires that
Pr(A+B) = Pr(A) + Pr(B) for all A;B 2 A(B(H)). How can this principle
to justied by a Dutch book construction to which the QBians appeal (see
Caves et al. 2003a) when A and B are non-commuting and there is no
possibility of settling simultaneous bets on A, B, and A+B?
Finally, consider the rule for updating on an e¤ect A 2 A(B(H)) that has
been proposed by the the advocates of the operational approach, viz., updat-
ing on A 2 A(B(H)) is given by Pr()  ! PrA() =: Pr(A1=2A1=2)=Pr(A).
Note that the di¢ culty discussed above in Section 3.2 for Lüders updating
probabilities on P(B(H)) does not arise for a¤ects; for if A;B 2 A(B(H))
then ABA 2 A(B(H)) even if A and B dont commute, so a detour through
states is not needed. However, the proposed updating rule does not produce
what is comfortably interpreted as a conditional probability; in particular,
PrA(A) 6= 1 unless A is a projection. Perhaps the QBians will reply that
QM teaches us that the notion of what counts as the objects of belief has to
be liberalized to include non-propositional entities. Pursuing this matter is a
project for another occasion.20
Acknowledgment: I am grateful to Aristidis Arageorgis, Gordon Be-
lot, Tom Pashby, and Laura Ruetsche for helpful comments on this project.
Needless to say, I alone am responsible for the opinions express herein.
20Although POVMs may not further the case of QBism, they are useful in studying
the foundations of QM. See, for example, Pashby (2014) for a discussion of how POVMs
can be used to illuminate various aspects of time in QM.
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